John J. Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc., A Utah Corporation : Brief of Appellant by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965)
1965
John J. Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc., A Utah
Corporation : Brief of Appellant
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Arthur H. Neislen and Franklyn B. Matheson; Attorneys for
Appellants.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Sweeney v. Happy Valley, No. 10259 (1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4777
. IN THE SUPREME COURT 
'OF THE STATE OF UTAH . 
.. JOHN J. SWEENEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellamt, 
vs. 
BAPPY VALLEY, INC., a Utah oor-
· poration, 
Defendamt and Respondef'llt. 
BRIEF OF APPEL 
Appeal From a Judgment o.f thi.;,-, 
Court of Salt ;Lake County ~'Ji 
.::..:.. ~~ 
ARTHUR :a 
FRANKLYN .. 
"' '.~ ... k~ 
- ' ~ 
Nielsen, Conder fi. 
510 Newhouse " 
Salt Lake City,,. . . 
Attorneys for A ... 
. ~ 
A:THAN J. FULLMER t• :. 
·. xecutive Building F I . ." .·-~" 
alt Lake City, Utah L ·'' 
\ ... 
BERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. DEC l' 
. earns Building 
&It Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
.!'.·!'. 
··.r"i \. · • 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASK....................................................... 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT.................................... 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL...................................................... 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ...... -------------·············---------------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT ----·-········-----·-·-·······--··--·--·····-··-··-···--··-···----------------------------17 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ANALYSIS AND DE-
TERMINATION OF THE ISSUES__________________________________________ 17 
A. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TREATING 
THE CASE SOLELY AS AN ACTION IN THE 
NATURE OF AN EQUITABLE ACCOUNTING 
AND IN REFUSING APPELLANT A JURY 
TRIAL ------------······-------------------------------------------------------------------- 18 
B. 
C. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMIN-
ING THAT APPELLANT HAD TO PROVE 
THAT THE CONDUCT OF THE PRINCIPALS 
OR RESPONDENT CORPORATION IN DEAL-
ING WITH THEMSELVES IN CONVEYANCES 
OF REAL PROPERTY FROM RESPONDENT 
CORPORATION WAS DISHONEST AND 
FRAUDULENT AS TO APPELLANT____________________________ 29 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER 
AND MAKE FINDINGS IN RESPECT TO THE 
RIGHTS OF APPELLANT UNDER THE TERMS 
OF THE CONTRACT FOR THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE PROPERTY, THE SUBJECT OF 
THE AGREEMENT .......... ---------------------------------------------------- 40 
D. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO HEAR 
AND RECEIVE CERTAIN TESTIMONY.___________________ 43 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ANALYSIS AND IN-
TERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT OF AU-
GUST 8, 1957 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 46 
SUMMARY ---------------····-·············-··-·····--·······-······--·····---------------------------55 
---
TABLE OF CONTENTS - (Continued) 
Pag, 
AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Atkins v. Atkins, 70 Vt. 565, 41 Atl. 503 .......................................... . 
Bear River Valley Orchard Co. v. Hanley, 15 Utah 506, 
60 Pac. 611 .............................................................................. . 3i 
Board of Education of Salt Lake City v. Bothwell and 
Swaner Company (decided April 2, 1965), 400 P. 2d 568 ..... . 5: 
Clark and Wilson Lumber Co. of Delaware v. McAllister, 
(9 Cir.) 101 F. 2d 709 ..................................................................... . 
Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 8 L. ed. 2d 44, 
82 S. Ct. 894 ................................................................................... . 2i 
Daitch Crystal Dairies, Inc. v. Neisloss, 
8 N.Y. 2d 723, 201 N.Y.S. 2d 101... ................................ . 
Farrell v. City of Ontario, 39 Cal. App. 351, 178 P. 740 ............... . 
Gaddis Investment Co. v. Morrison, 3 U. 2d 43, 278 P. 2d 284 ... . 
Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 
77 Utah 362, 296 Pac. 231.. ......................................................... . 3o 
Halloran-Judge Trust Company v. Heath, 
70 Utah 124, 258 P. 342 ............................................................. . 
Hansen v. Granite Holding Company, 117 Utah 530, 
210 P. 2d 274 ................................................................................. . 31 
Mardel Securities, Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette Corp., 
(4 Cir.) 320 F. 2d 890 ................................................................ . 3S 
Norback v. Board of Directors of Church Extension 
Society, 84 Utah 506, 37 P. 2d 339 ........................................... . 
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 84 L. ed 281, 60 S. Ct. 238 ........... . 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, (5 Cir.) 155 F. 2d 185 ........ 48,51 
Reback v. Story Production, Inc., 9 A.D. 880, 193 N.Y.S. 2d 520 .. 48 
Simper v. Brown, 74 Utah 178, 278 P. 529 .................................... . 
State ex rel Hansen v. Hart, 26 Utah 229, 72 P. 938 ................... . 23 
Tallman v. Eastern Illinois and Peoria Railroad Co., 
379 Ill. 441, 41 N.E. 2d 537 ....................................................... . 51 
Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 119 Utah 204, 
225 P. 2d 739 (1950) ..................................................................... . 
Watson Brothers Transportation Co., Inc. v. Jaffa, 
(8 Cir.) 143 F. 2d 340 ................................................................ · 
Williams v. Herring, 183 La. 127, 165 N.W. 342 .......................... · 
~II 
TABLE OF CONTENTS - (Continued) 
Page 
Constitution, Statutes and Rules 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 19-------------------------------- 21 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
Section 78-21-1 22 
Section 78-33-9 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 29 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38 (a>------------------------------------ 22 
Texts 
1 Am. Jur. 2d, Accounts and Accounting 
Section 45 
Section 51 
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, Section 445.----------------------------------------------· 
Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporation (Permanent Edition) 
Revised Vol. No. 3 
Section 921 --········---·-·-·-··---·-·-···--·--·-·-···-···-------------------------------
Section 937 
Section 949 
19 
19,20 
23 
34 
33 
32 
Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd Edition __________________ 51, 52 
Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Vol. 5, Section 1293________ 46 
IN THE SUPREME C01UR T 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.JOHN J. SWEENEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HAPPY VALLEY, INC., a Utah cor-
poration, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
10259 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Insofar as pertinent to this appeal, the matter in-
volves an action by Plaintiff and Appellant for money 
daimed to be due him from the Defendant and Respond-
~nt Happy Valley, Inc. under the terms of a written 
contract, in which action Appellant alleges breach of the 
contract, seeks a determination of his rights under such 
contract, an accounting by Respondent for the money 
due Appellant and for injunctive relief. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Although the Pretrial Order explicitly framed the 
1 lk8Ul's and set the matter down for "jury trial," the 
1 
Judge before whom the case was tried determined at thl' 
beginning of the trial that the matter ·was one stricth 
for an equitable accounting and refused Appellant a jur; 
trial. The Trial Court further limited the issues to h~ 
tried to an equitable accounting, resolved those issue' 
against Appellant, fixed a formula upon which it decrterl 
Respondent had to account, and directed that Respondent 
forthwith account on such basis without making am 
determination as to the amount owing. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks by this appeal to have the Suprenw 
Court determine that the lower Court erred in its analysii 
and determination of the issues and in its analysis ana 
interpretation of the contract; that on the basis of tlw 
agreement between the parties and the facts adduced at 
the trial Appellant was and is entitled to be paid li1 I 
Respondent in respect to the transfer of title of varioui 
lots and parcels of property on the basis of a price or 
amount greater than that accounted by Respondent; arnl 
that Appellant was entitled to a jury trial in the deter· 
mination of the issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about August 8, 1957, Appellant John J. 
Sweeney (and other parties not involved in this action) 
entered into a written Agreement with Respondent Happ)' 
Valley, Inc. providing for the subdivision, development 
and improvement of certain land located near the mouth 
2 
CTI' of Big Cottonwood Canyon in Salt Lake County, State of 
h rt ah. ( R. 49-56) 
ry 
fw The Agreement recites that First Party (Respondent 
e' herPin) is the owner of, or entit1E>d to sell, certain land 
erl ~ituat(•d in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, consisting 
nt of approximately 366 acres; that it desires to develop the 
ny said land and to subdivide a portion thereof for residen-
111' 
SJ~ 
na 
lw 
at 
ti1 I 
ilk 
or 
nd 
er· 
tial building lots and reserve a suitable portion thereof 
for use as a golf course and country club. The Agreement 
further recites that Second Party (of whom Appellant 
is the only party presently interested therein) is to effect 
the organization of a non-profit corporation under the 
laws of the State of Utah, to be known as the Willow 
Cn·ek Country Club, for the purpose of buying and de-
YPloping a portion of said Entire Premises sufficient in 
area and terrain for an 18-hole golf course. (R. 49, 50) 
Paragraph 6 of said Agreement (with vvhich para-
graph we are primarily concerned) provides that First 
Party intends "to develop, subdivide, and sell as resi-
dential lots, and a shopping center in conjunction there-
with, all of said Entire Premises, except the Club Prem-
iso8. Said Entire Premises shall not be sold or developed 
in any other manner except on the written consent of 
Second Party." ( R. 51) 
J. Said paragraph further provides that the "gross 
in) )lrocerds of sales of all such property sold for residential 
Jp)' lot~ :,.:hall be divided" so that 75% would be paid to 
ent Respondent (First Party) and the other 25%, after initial 
uth dt><lnction of a certain amount to pay a proportionate 
3 
I 
I 
part of the initial cost of acquisition of the properly, I 
should be paid to Second Party (Appellant and otlwrs.). I 
In the event any part of the Entire Premises ii 
traded or exchanged for other land "that portion of thF 
Entire Premises so traded shall he valued on the hasii 
of its fair market value for the purpose of deterrninini 
gross proceeds of sale and applying the 75%-25% ratio 
hereinabove referred to." 
Finally, Paragraph 6 provides that First Party shall 
render an accounting to Second Party "not less fo. 
quently than quarterly, showing all sales made from 
the Entire Premises and showing the gross proceeds ol 
sale, together with a showing of the distribution thmof 
as provided in this paragraph. Sums due Second Party 
under the provisions of this paragraph shall be paid 
monthly." (R. 51, 52) 
Paragraph 8 sets forth the respective interests of 
the persons who comprise Second Party, including Appel-
lant Sweeney who was and is the owner of 31.8% of 
the 25% interest of Second Party. (R. 53) This interest 
entitles Appellant to receive 7.75% of the total gross pro· 
ceeds ref erred to in the contract. Since then, the other 
persons comprising Second Party have transferred their 
respective interests to Respondent (First Party) thereby I 
leaving Appellant as the only person entitled to share 
with Respondent in the gross proceeds from the sale of 
the "Entire Premises." Likewise, at the time the con· 
tract was executed C. Taylor Burton, Owen \V. Bunker 
and G. Kirk Graff owned all the stock of First ParlY 
4 
I 
I 
\'I (Respondent herein) in equal shares and were the of-
.· I ficers and directors of the company. (R. 321) Prior to i). I 
Ii 
ni 
lio 
ail 
Jill 
ol 
·of 
·ty 
1id 
est 
ro· 
lei' 
eir 
>by 
ire 
of 
on· I 
ker I 
rt1· 
I 
the commencement of this action Graff sold his interest 
in R<'fipondent corporation to Burton and Bunker. 
Suhsequent to the execution of the foregoing con-
trart Res1rnndent provided with plans for a subdivision 
and entered into a contract with American Insurance 
Corporation about April 10, 1958, for the promotion 
of sal<'fi of the residential lots. (R. 510) A preliminary 
i;nhdivision plan was prepared indentifying individual 
lots (Exhibit 31-P), listing "sales agency" contracts were 
~xeeut<:'d with An1erican Housing on September 21, 1958, 
for sale of individual lots ranging in price from $3,999.00 
to $7,-1:99.00 (Exhibit 21-P). (R 512) 
·within less than a month after these listing agree-
111Pnts \Ycre signed three lots in the proposed subdivision 
had he<>n sold and earnest money receipts obtained (Ex-
hibit 30-P). One lot was sold to a Mr. Bain for $3,999.00, 
one to Howard J. Ford for $4,999.00; and the other to 
0. V. Hansen for $4,500.00 (Exhibit 30-P). However, 
since the subdivision had not been approved it was nec-
0~sary to hold up sales so that no more were made 
prior to the approval of the subdivision plat. (R. 380) 
In fact, the earnest money agreements ref erred to above 
wen• called and "options" were given to the parties. 
(Exhibits 32-D, 33-D) Thereafter certain changes were 
1nade in the subdivision plat and a portion only of the 
Entire Premises was subdivided into four subdivisions 
\Yi.th the lots being renumbered. The plat for subdivision 
l \\'as filed and approved on November 4, 1959, after 
lht- subdivision improvements were put in. (R. 366) 
5 
During the interim the three principals of Respond. 1 
ent corporation (Burton, Bunker and Graff) were ass('°' ! 
ing themselves monthly for cash contributions to the ! 
corporation "to keep up the uniform real estate con. 
1 
tracts underlying the subdivjsion, as \vell as to mah 
payments on improvements being installed.'' (R. 366) 
Shortly after subdivision 1, containing 40 lots, was 
approved Respondent corporation conveyed to the thre,, i 
principals who were its sole stockholders, officers a111l 
directors, 24 lots in that subdivision. (R. 323, 388, 507) 
The plats for subdivisions 2 and 3 containing 110 I 
lots, were recorded on April 5, 1961; and on .May lll, 
1961, Respondent corporation conveyed to Owen \V. Buu 
ker 1 lot in subdivision 1, 12 lots in subdivision 2 and 11 
lots in subdivisjon 3. At the same time 5 lots in subdiri-
sion 2 and 19 lots in subdivision 3 were conveyed to G. 
Kirk Grafff; and 3 lots in subdivision 2 and 21 lots in 
subdivision 3 were conveyed to C. Taylor Burton. (R. 321, 
388, 507, Exhibit 14-D) 
0'' In a letter sent to Appellant under date of May .. u, 
1961, Respondent corporation outlined certain difficulties 
which it stated had been encountered in getting the sub-
division plats approved and lots sold so that the individ-
• • 11 
ual officers "have had to make cash contributions. 
Respondent then stated that these contributions "had 
been secured to the sponsors by the corporation deeding 
to them sufficient lots to equal the cash necessary to keep 
1 
the company's land payments current." The basis used 
as value was stated to be $3,000.00 per lot which the letter 
1 said had been established by outside appraisers (Exhibit I
I 6 I 
J2-P). The appraisals referred to were received in evi-
dencP in Exhibits 8-D through 13-D, inclusive. They are 
dated in October and November, 1960, and August, 1961, 
although they relate back to December, 1960. They in-
volve only lots in subdivision 1 and were used in connec-
tion with an investigation by the Federal Government 
"on tax questions concerning the valuation." (R. 371) 
Two of the appraisals (Exhibits 8-D and 9-D) are 
very general and give a value of an average of $3,000.00 
per lot. Two other appraisals (Exhibits 9-D and 13-D) 
\1we made in a more detailed manner and appraised the 
lots at an average value of $3,500.00 and $3,450.00 per 
lot rPs1wctively. 
The corporate minutes of Respondent show that 
on ~ ovember 4, 1959, the corporation was indebted to 
eaeh of the three stockholders in the sum of $17,000.00 
represented by unsecured notes, and that Mr. Bunker 
was unwilling to make further contributions without 
"some kind of security for a return of some of funds 
already advanced. As a method of reducing the com-
pany's obligation to the principals he suggested each 
taking title to some lots to offset some of the company's 
borrowings. The lots would be taken at cost, after de-
termining same, or $3,000.00 which was offered by Mr. 
Shaw, or whichevPr was greater." (R. 35) 
On some of the lots taken by the principals there 
werp outstanding mortgages of $2,000.00 (R. 577) so 
that the corporation received from the principals a reduc-
tion of $1,000.00 only on its indebtedness to them since 
7 
they individually assumed such mortgage indebtednesi. 
(R. 579, Exhibit 42-P) Likewise a portion of the indebt. ! 
edness O\\ling by Respondent company to its stockholders 
(at least insofar as G. Kirk Graff was concerned) arose 
from salary rather than from cash contributions. (R. 507) 
In addition to the lots conveyed to the principals 
1
1 
Respondent made other transfers or sales. 
On or about April 6, 1959, a tract of land approx-
imately the size of one lot was conveyed to the Salt 
Lake \Vater Conservancy District on ·which a well \\'a:' i 
located. (R. 31) This property is referred to throughout 
the Record as the "wellsite." 
On or about April 4, 1961, a small portion of lot~. 
subdivision 2, was conveyed to a David L. Jessup tu 
clarify the boundary line. (R. 32) 
On or about January 29, 1962, Respondent conveyed 
a tract of approximately 30 acres (surveyed by George 
B. Gudgell to be 31.07 acres) (R. 275) to Twenty-Five 
Associates, Inc. and R. E . .McConaughy in exchange for 
their interest (as some of Second Party) in the contract 
dated August 8, 1957. (R. 31, 32) Twenty-Five Assoc· 
iates, Inc. owned 41.4% of Second Party's interest in 
said contract and 1\1.r. McConaughy owned 9.5%. (R. 53) 
On or about April 30, 1962, Respondent conveyed to 
Estates, Inc. a tract of land in excess of two acres, com 
prising a portion of several lots in subdivision 4 in ex· 
change for the offsite improvement on Respondent's lots 
in subdivision 4. (R. 32, 394-397) 
8 
None of these transactions had ever been reported 
to Appellant or accounted for by Respondent prior to 
the trial (Exhibits 14-D, 15-D and 16-D). At the trial 
Respondent acknowledged that an accounting had to be 
made for the 30 acre tract conveyed to Twenty-Five 
ARsociates, Inc. and McConaughy. (R. 268) 
A few other lots were sold and conveyed to third 
parties as reflected on the accountings rendered by Ap-
pellant. (Exhibits 14-D, 15-D and 16-D) 
The balance of the lots remaining in subdivisions 1, 
~. and ~i ( 33 in number) were sold under a contract to 
Uordon and Bush, Inc. on July 15, 1963, for $181,500.00 
or approximately $5,500.00 per lot. This contract in-
rolved a down payment of $500.00 only and allowed the 
buyers four years to complete the purchase provided not 
less than seven lots per year were paid for. (Exhibit 27-P) 
Insofar as the other property comprising the "Entire 
Promises'' is concerned a portion was subdivided as 
rnbdivision 4; and the balance is yet to be developed. 
After the present action was filed and on or about Sep-
temhPr, 1962, an additional four lots in subdivision 4 
Were trnnsf erred each to C. Taylor Burton and to Owen 
W. Bunker who by then were the sole stockholders of 
the company. (R. 32) The consideration for the sale 
iras still $3,000.00 per lot. (R. 324, 389) 
Some of the lots conveyed to the principals were sold 
by thPm to other individuals. For instance, on April 4, 
l9G2, Burton transferred Lot 559 in subdivision 1 to 
9 
Gibbons and Reed Company for a credit of $6,250.00 
on the balance owing to Gibbons and Reed Company by 
Respondent company for offsite improvements. At the 
same time Mr. Bunker transferred Lot 589 in subdivision 
1 to Gibbons and Reed Company for a credit of $6,200.00 
on such obligation owing by Respondent company. (R. 
331, 91, 9·4) Other conveyances of lots by the principals 
are set forth in the Answers to Interrogatories filed 
by them. (R. 91-94) However, the Trial Court refused to ! 
receive testimony with respect to many other such con-
veyances made. (R. 582-591) 
The first formal accounting made by Respondent to 
Appellant (or others of Second Party) on account of 
any sales of lots by Respondent corporation was made 
July 17, 1962. (R. 253, 1019, Exhibit 14-D). This account· 
ing showed the number of lots conveyed by Respondent 
to Mr. Burton, Mr. Bunker and Mr. Graff up to that 
time. (Exhibit 14-D) 
Following receipt of the July 17, 1962, accounting, 
Appellant herein filed legal action against the Respond· 
ent company and its officers and directors Owen W. 
Bunker, C. Taylor Burton and G. Kirk Graff, said action 
being filed on August 17, 1962 (R. 1-3) The Complaint 
was thereafter amended twice. (R. 69, 121) Motions filed 
on behalf of the individual Defendants were ultimately 
granted by the Court (R. 175) ; and all causes of action 
other than the Second Cause of Action were dismissed 
prior to or in connection with the pretrial conference 
held. (R. 175, 261) 
10 
A pretrial was held on September 11, 1963. The 
Pretrial Order enteered by the Court recites that the 
"Second Cause of Action is an action for an accounting 
for declaratory relief as to the rights of the Plaintiff 
and for injunctive relief, all of which arises out of the 
photostatic copy of the contract which is a part of the 
file lwrein," entered into on August 8, 1957. (R. 195) 
The issues framed by the Court as to the Second 
Cause of Action are as follows: 
"l. "Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to have the 
lots which were conveyed from the corporation to the 
individual officers and directors of the corporation ac-
counteecl for at any other value than that which was 
fixed by those officers and directors at the time of such 
conveyances ; 
"2 "Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to have the 
subdivided lots which were conveyed to other persons 
than those mentioned above evaluated at any other figure 
than that heretofore asserted by the corporation; and 
"3. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to have the 
undivided tracts of land which have heretofore been con-
veyed out of the corporation evaluateed as residential 
lots, and if so, at what value." (R. 195) 
In addition to the foregoing issues the Judge who 
conducteed the pretrial further stated in the Pretrial 
Order that the Plaintiff contends "That it is entitled 
to a declaratory judgment determining his rights under 
the August 8, 1957, contract as to accountings, time of 
11 
payment, and the rate and rnaun0r of dPvelopuwnt 0f 
the properties subject of the AgrN~rnent." (R. 196) 
The Pretrial Order further states: 
"At the time of the pretrial it was stipulated and 
agreed by and between the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
that Plaintiff is entitled to an accounting as to the i1u-
proved lots conveyed by the Defendant. Defendant con-
tends that the accountings should be predicated on tlw 
actual gross proceeds received by the corporation for the 
lots conveyed. Plaintiff contends that he is entitled 
to an accounting based on the fair markc-t value of thr 
property as residential lots at the times of com·r~·ancP." 
"As to the unimproved property, which has been 
conveyed by the Defendant, Defendant contends first 
that Plaintiff is not entitled to an accounting on thi~ 
unimproved property. flo,vever, in the event the Court 
determines that Plaintiff is so entitled to such an account-
ing, then it is Defendant's contention that such accounting 
should be predicated only on the fair market value of 
the property conveyed as unimproved property at the 
time of the conveyance. The Plaintiff contends that they 
are entitled to the fair market value of that property 
as subdivided residential lots at that time." (R. 197) 
The Pretrial Order then dirPcts that the ease ''be 
set for jury trial" (such trial having been demanded by 
Appellant herein) for December 9, 1963. (R. 194) 
The matter came on for trial lwfore the Honorable 
Merrill C. Faux, who dismissed the jury at the beginning 
12 
of the trial, because he determined the case involved only 
an equitable accounting between the parties. Counsel 
for Appellant at the time of trial excepted to the Court's 
rnling-, stating that Plaintiff had filed a Demand for 
.Jury rrrial and paid a fee, that Plaintiff was entitled 
tu a jury (R. 249). Respondent was permitted to go for-
11ard with the proof by offering in evidence the account-
ings tlien·tofore made to Appellant on July 17, 1962 
(}~xhihit 1--!:-D), December 26, 1962 (Exhibit 15-D), and 
SqJtPmber 9, 1963 (Exhibit 16-D), following which the 
Court stated that "it appears to the Court that the 
c·harg·e is somewhat in the nature of an action in fraud 
- ePrtain things have done here which you now seek 
relief upon, saying that they have <lone, but <lone by 
lJad faith so that it isn't simply a charge of breach of 
rnntract ·where you ·would ask for certain damages and 
proceed upon proof to the extent of preponderance but 
that .mu may be required to make your proof clear and 
ronvincing." (R. 259) Appellant replied that he did not 
claim had faith, but rather that Respondent "entered 
into this transaction with themselves." 
"They conveyed from the corporation they 
controlled, to themselves, this property." "What 
we are claiming here, is that they have simply 
breached the contract; doesn't matter whether 
tht7 did it in good faith or not." 
•'If they breached it, they breached it. We 
claim the contract required them to make sales 
which would require market value, and that they 
made sales to themselves which did not establish 
market value because who is the judge in a sale 
to yourself - not yourself, of course. That is 
our point. It isn't the question of bad faith, at 
all. " ( R. 2GO) 
13 
The Court then stated its view: 
"Now, if you contend that they proceeded 
under the contract and that the difference between 
you is interpretation of the contract, then that 
is probably for the Court to determine - what 
is meant by the parties as sign their names to it. 
* * * 
"Second, this will be then - after I have 
interpreted it - did the parties proceed in accord-
ance with that interpretation~ That may be a 
mixed question of law and fact." (R. 261) 
After further discussion, the Court finally concluded: 
"I am going to proceed as though this were 
an action in equity for an accounting between the 
parties . You have, by Stipulation, presented to 
me now what the parties have offered to do in 
a way of accounting. 
"Plaintiff may proceed carrying the burden 
of proof - carrying the burden of going forward 
- and the burden of proof charging that, under 
the contract, a proper accounting has not been 
made or tendered." (R. 267) 
The case thereupon proceeded to trial. Following 
a rather protracted hearing lasting several days, during 
which the examination of Appellant's witnesses was fre-
quently and repeatedly interrupted for so-called "voir 
dire'' examination, the Court rendered a memorandum 
decision in which it: 
1. Rejected the position of Appellant and that Re-
spondent was required to go forward with proof to 
sustain the adequacy and propriety of the accounting by 
clear and convincing evidence; 
14 
2. Rejected Appellant's claim that he should be 
granted relief against Respondent "as for a breach of 
contract'' ; 
3. Rejected Appellant's request for a jury trial; 
4. Determined that the matter had to be tried as an 
equitable accounting; 
' 5. Determined that Appellant had the burden of 
proving the conduct of the Respondent corporation to-
ward Appellant was dishonest and fraudulent; 
G. Accepted evidence of fair market value as one 
of the factors which would enable it to decide whether 
Resopndent's actions were "so far from reasonable con-
duct that equity would require different standards than 
those already used or proposed in the accounting;" 
7. Commented that Appellant's witnesses on "fair 
market value" gave the impression of having had "more 
than necessary instruction" from Appellant "in hope that 
they would reproduce his views;" while the testimony of 
Respondent's witnesses was more helpful to the Court; 
and 
8. Concluded that Respondent must include in its 
accounting interest on receipts from deferred payment 
contracts and "must now promptly account and pay" in 
accordance with the Court's decision and hereafter "ac-
count and pay promptly when there is something to 
account and pay, at the time prescribed in the contract." 
The Court otherwise resolved the issues in favor 
of Respondent, denied any relief to Appellant, and di-
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rected counsel for the Respondent corporation to prepare 
appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
( R. 206-209) 
Thereafter, the Court issued a supplemental decision 
in which it specifically referred to the transfer of 31.07 
acres to the Twenty-Five Associates and McConaughy. 
Since the tract involved was zoned for Al use, the Court 
concluded that the sale and purchase of the property as 
a tract "\Yas necessarily as and for residential lots." 
In addition the Court found that Respondent corporation 
sold its equity in that tract for a consideration which, 
as reported in the accounting made in open Court during 
the course of the trial, was fair and reasonahle. (R. 210) 
The Court signed the Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law submitted to it by Respondent (R. 211-218), 
and rendered judgment in favor of the Respondent and 
against the Appellant. (R. 219-221) 
·Thereafter, Appellant filed a Motion to Alter and 
Amend the Findings, Conclusions and Decree or in the 
alternative for a new trial. (R. 230-234) The Court 
denied the Motions in toto, but did make an amendment 
to the Findings to the effect that Appellant "by his 
act and conduct, and the negotiations with Happy Valley 
held from time to time during the periods in question, 
waived his contractual right to receive quarterly account-
ings and monthly payments under the terms of said 
Agreement, as well as all interest on such payments to 
the dates that the tenders of payments were made by 
Happy Valley as more specifically set forth in Finding 
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No. 14 on file herein." (R. 236) Appellant thereupon 
filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 243) 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ANALYSIS AND DE-
TERMINATION OF THE ISSUES. 
ln order to assist this Court in reviewing the various 
claims of Appellant in respect to this matter, we have 
sub-divided the discussion of this point into several spe-
cific sub-topics with respect to which Appellant classes 
tlw Trial Court erred in its determination of the issues, 
as follows: 
A. The Trial Court erred in treating the case solely 
as an action in the nature of an equitable accounting and 
in refusing Appellant a jury trial. 
B. The Trial Court erred in determining that in 
order to be entitled to relief Appellant had to prove 
that the conduct of the principals of Respondent corpora-
tion in dealing with themselves in conveyances of real 
property from Respondent corporation was dishonest 
and fraudulent as to Appellant. 
C. The Trial Court failed to consider and make 
findings in respect to the rights of Appellant under the 
terms of the contract for the development of the property, 
the subject of the Agreement. 
D. The Court erred in refusing to hear and receive 
CPrtain testimony. 
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A. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TREATING THE 
CASE SOLELY AS AN ACTION IN THE NATURE 
OF AN EQUITABLE ACCOUNTING AND IN REFUS-
ING APPELLANT A JURY TRIAL. 
Although the Court may have understandably been 
somewhat confused because of the background of this 
case involving amended pleadings, additional parties and 
previous Orders of the Court dismissing certain of the 
Causes of Action and also dismissing the action as to all 
individual parties, the Pretrial Order specifically sets 
forth the issues which the Trial Court was called upon to 
hear and determine. As to the Second Cause of Action 
remaining the Order recites that it is "for an accounting 
for declaratory relief as to the rights of the Plaintiff 
and for injunctive relief" arising out of the contract dated 
August 8, 1957. (R. 195) 
The specific issues set out by the Order have little 
or no relationship to any so-called action for an equitable 
accounting. The issues as framed are: ( 1) Whether 
Plaintiff is entitled to have the lots conveyed by the 
corporation to the individual officers and directors ac-
counted for at any other values than those fixed by the 
same officers and directors; (2) Whether the Plaintiff 
is entitled to have the property conveyed to other persons 
than the officers and directors evaluated at any figure 
other than that asserted by the corporation; and 
(3) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to have the undi· 
vided tracts of land which have been conveyed out of 
the corporation evaluated as residential lots and if so, 
at what value. (R. 195) 
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These questions, the Court stated in the Pretrial 
Order, arise out of the construction of the contract dated 
August 8, 1957 "which the Trial Court will have to com-
pletely read and attempt to understand before this matter 
is tried." (R. 196) 
That Appellant is entitled to have Respondent "ac-
count" to him for the monies received from the sale of 
the lots has never been disputed. Not only does the con-
tract specifically so provide, but it has always been 
conceded by Respondent corporation and was so con-
ceded by it at the beginning of the trial. There is, there-
fore, little or no basis for limiting the matter solely to 
considering an equitable accounting. In any event, how-
ever, there was no reason for construing the matter as 
one for an equitable accounting rather than a common 
law action for an accounting. 
As stated in I Am. Jur. 2d, ACCOUNTS AND 
ACCOUNTING, Section 45: 
"The action of account is designed to provide 
a remedy to compel a person who, by virtue of 
some confidential or trust relation, has received 
or been entrusted with money or property belong-
ing to another or which is to be applied or disposed 
of in a particular manner, to render an account 
thereof, and to recover the balance found to be 
due." 
On the other hand, Section 51 states the following 
with respect to the equitable action for an accounting: 
"Equitable jurisdiction for an accounting is 
usually put upon the following grounds: (1) the 
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existence of a fidueiary relationship with a dutv 
resting upon the Defendant to render an account· 
(2) the existence of mutual account or if th~ 
accnunt is all on one side, the fact that the account 
is complicated_; and (3) the need for a discovery. 
A court may also assume jurisdiction where other 
grounds for invoking equity, such as fraud, mul-
tiplicity or suits, etc., are present. However, 
eqitity will not take jitrisdiction in itncomplicated 
rnatters of account, absent some other ground for 
equitable jitrisdiction, since to do so might involve 
the eqitity courts in the trial of matters properly 
tn"able in an ordinary assmnpsit action." (Em-
phasis added.) 
Section 51 thereafter concludes: 
"But 1vhere the principal purpose of a suit 
is not a subject of equity jurisdiction, and the 
discovery and accounting sought therein are 
merely incidental and dependent on the main is-
sues, equity will not generally take jurisdiction 
on grounds of accounting." 
These general principles of law have been adhered 
to in this jurisdiction. In the case of H a.lloran-J11dgc 
Trust Company vs. 11 eath, 70 Utah 124, 258 P. :3±2, the 
Supreme Court held that although the specific relief re-
quested in the Complaint was an accounting and injunc-
tion, what the Plaintiff actually was entitled to, if 
anything, was the recovery of money claimed to be owing 
under a contract which was obtainable only in an action 
at law. 
In the case of Williams vs. Herring, 183 Ia. 127, 165 
NW 342, the Iowa Supreme Court was concerned with the 
problem of whether the action should be referred to 
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the equity side of the Court. Plaintiff's <Complaint alleged 
8 violation by Defendant of certain terms of a written 
contract entered into between the parties. Defendant 
contended that inasmuch as there would be numerous 
accounb involved in determining whether or not any 
amount was due Plaintiff under the contract, the matter 
~ltould be tr an sf erred to the ec1uity side of the Court. 
In analyzing the matter the Court stated: 
"Apparently, the principal reason for seeking 
a transfer of this cause to equity is that same can 
there be much more conveniently, and probably 
efficiently, tried than at law. Conceding that this 
is true, yet the pleadings do not disclose a con-
troversy arising out of a matter cognizable in a 
court of equity, and the relief sought upon the 
first count is for a sum alleged to be due as 
compensation and upon the second count for dam-
ages based upon an alleged violation of one of the 
provisions of said contract. The question of mu-
tual accounts is not, under the pleadings, involved. 
The fact that the controversy involves a large 
number of items of debit and credit arising out 
of many business transactions, and that same 
could be more conveniently tried to the Court, is 
not a ground of equitable jurisdiction. The test 
is not whether the cause can be more conveniently 
or satisfactorilv tried and determined by the 
Court than a ju;y but the accounts must be mutual 
requiring an accounting, or there must be some 
other ground or equitable cognizance not shown 
to exist in this case." 
Since under our constitution (Article VIII, Section 
HJ) any distinction between actions at law and equity 
has been abolished and there is but one form of civil 
action ·what difference does it make whether the Court 
' 
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treated the matter as an equitable accounting or as an 
action at law? Not only did this ruling result in undu]y 
restricting and limiting the scope of inquiry in the ca8.e 
(as will be discussed more particularly hereinafter), it 
persuaded the Court to refuse Appellant a jury trial. 
Although the Pretrial Order set the matter down for a 
jury trial (R. 19-1), the Trial Court after determining 
the action was for an equitable accounting dismissed the 
jury and tried the case to the Court. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (which follow 
quite closely the Federal Rules) provide that "the right 
of trial by jury as declared by the constitution or a' 
given by statute shall be preserved to the parties." (Rule 
38(a)) Our statute, Section 78-21-1, U.C.A., 1953, pro-
vides: 
"In actions for the recovery of specific real or 
personal property, with or without damages, or 
for money claimed a.s due itpon contract or as 
damages for breach of contract, or for injuries, 
an issue of fact may be tried by a jury, unlrss 
a jury trial is waived or a reference is ordered." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Certainly the instant action is one "for money 
claimed as due upon contract" as above defined. Un-
fortunately, however, the lower Court apparently was 
unduly inflenced by the use of the phrase "action for 
an accounting" without considering the over-all object 
of the suit. In fact, the Court stated: "If there has been 
a breach, then the parties are not entitled to an account-
ing. If the contract remains in force - binding upon the 
parties - you are entitled to an accounting thereunder.'' 
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(R. 2G5) And in its memorandum decision the Court 
;;tated: 
"Could not reconcile the conflicts of a demand 
for an accounting under a contract intact and for 
damages under a contract breached." (R. 207) 
The Court never 4uite realized that it ·was the failure 
to make an accounting according to the terms of the 
contract which constituted the breach giving rise to the 
adion by Appellant here; and the request for an account-
ing was only ancillary to the request that the rights 
of the Appellant under the contract be determined. It 
certainly ·was not neecssary, as the Court stated, for the 
Plaintiff to rescind or disavow the contract in order to 
secure relief for the breach thereof. ( 17 Am. J ur. 2d, 
COKTRACTS, Section 445) 
A noted case on the right to a jury trial in the 
State of Utah is the case of N orback vs. Board of Direc-
tors of Church Extension Society, 84 Utah 506, 37 P. 2d 
339, where the Court held that it was error to refuse the 
Plaintiff a jury trial, in rendering its decision the Court 
tJUoted from the earlier case of State ex rel Hansen vs. 
Hart, 26 Utah 220, 72 P. 938, as follows: 
If the principles to which appeal must be had 
are principles of law in the main or primary ac-
tion, either party thereto upon demand is entitled 
to a trial by jury. This is true although applica-
tion is made to the Court to exercise its equity 
powers in granting injunctive relief. Where the 
issues are legal issues, the fact that equitable relief 
may be prayed for, to carry into effect the judg-
ment based upon the legal issues is not sufficient 
to deprive either party of his rights to have the 
legal issues submitted to a jury." 
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In th(• lat<'!' easp of T'ol!ey .1/orfllan; 1'. Fair1H111ks, 
119 F. :.20-l-, 2:23 P. :Zd 739, (1950), om ~h1pn•1ne Comt 
<>xtendf'd thr rnle laid do\rn in th<· X or hack Cas<' fmth
1
'1' 
in favor of gnarantt•Pinp; to tlH-' parti<•s the right to a 
trial b.v jnr)-. The Fairbanks Cas<• involved an actirm 
hy Plaintiff to Pnjoin D<·fondant from operating a funeral 
business in allegPd violation of an agn•e11H·nt h<·t\reen 
the parti<•s and for damages for past infraction:-; of tli1· 
agreement. rrhe trial court, on tlw basis of the rule laid 
down in tlw Xorbaek Case refm~ed a jnr:,· trial lwean~1· 
the Conrt "conceives in the light of the pra)·er for relief 
tlw parnmount object of the proeeeding is injunctive ... 
that th(• qu<>stion is primarily equitable, that the damage 
action ... is incidental to the primm')' relief; ... that the 
partiP:s an~ not <>ntitled as a riµ;ht to a jm)· to tr» tli1• 
cause." 
The ;:)upreme Court after citing our statute on the 
right to a jmy trial Jwld that tlw Dvf Pndant \'IP.s Pntitlerl 
to a jury trial as to said damages regardless of tlw 
primary or paramount object of the pron•<->ding. The 
Court quoted with approval frorn the case of F(/rrell r. 
City of Ontario, 39 Cal. App. 351, 178 P. 7-W, as follo\\'s: 
"There is no occasion in this state for the 
application of the rule that equity, once taki~g 
jurisdiction, will retain it for the purpose of dis-
posing of the entire case, because here the C'onrt 
may dispose of the entire case without the neces-
sity of trying it as a case wholly of eq~it~ble 
cogni:rnnce. Here the court, having jurisd1ct1on, 
mav hear and determine the equitable issue ac-
eording to the rules of equity, and the legal issues 
in accordance with the rules of laws, both in the 
same action." 
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Om Com·t then stated: 
"There is no persuasive reason why either 
party should not be entitled upon timely demand 
to a jury to determine the issues of fact raised by 
the legal causes of action." 
'11 he Supreme Court of the United States had occa-
sion to consider the right to a trial by jury in a matter 
involving an accounting under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Prneedme (which have been adopted in this State in 
rPspect to the matters referred to in the Court's opinion). 
In Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 8 L. ed 2d 44, 82 
S. Ct. 894, a complaint had been filed alleging a breach 
of a written trademark licensing agreement by failure to 
)lay the agreed amount for the exclusive right to use the 
trndmrnrk within a certain territory. A temporary ancl 
permanent injunction were requested along with an ac-
counting to determine the exact amount of money O\ving 
h? thP defendant and for judgment for that amount. 
Tlw trial court refused the defendant a jury trial where-
upon defendant petitioned for a writ of mandamus which 
brought the matter before the Supreme Court for review. 
Tlw Court discussed the history behind the right to a 
trial by jury in Federal Court and as presently in effect 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows: 
''At the outset, we may dispose of one of the 
grounds upon which the trial court acted in strik-
ing the demand for trial by jury - that based 
upon the view that the right to trial by jury may 
he lost as to legal issues where those issues are 
c harncterized as 'incidental' to equitable issues -
for our previous decisions make it plain that no 
such rule may be applied in the federal courts. 
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In Scott v. N ePly, decided in 1891, this Court 
held that a court of equity could not even takP 
jurisdiction of a suit 'in which a claim proper]\ 
cognizable only at law is united in the same plead. 
ings with a claim for equitable relief.' That hold-
ing, which was based upon both the historical 
separation between law and equity and the duty 
of the court to insure 'that the right to a trial L;. 
a jury in the legal action may be preserved intact:· 
created considerable inconvenience in that it nec-
t-ssitated two separate trials in the same case 
whenever that case contained both legal and equit-
able claims. Consequently, when the procedure in 
the federal courts was modernized by the adoption 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, 
it was deemed advisable to abandon that part of 
the holding of Seott v. Neely which rested upon 
the separation of law and equit>r and to permit 
the joinder of legal and equitable claims in a 
single action. Thus Rule 18 (a) provides that a 
plaintiff 'may join either as independent or a~ 
alternate claims as many claims either legal or 
equitable or both as he may have against an oppo~­
ing part.' And Rule 18 (b) provides: ,.Wherever 
a claim is one heretofore cognizable only aftrr 
another claim has been prosecuted to a conclusion, 
the two claims may be joined in a single action; 
but the court shall grant relief in that action only 
in accordance with the relative substantive rights 
of the parties. In particular, a plaintiff may st~te 
a claim for money and a claim to have set a~1de 
a conveyance fraudulent as to him, without f1~·st 
having obtained a judgment establishing the claun 
for money.' 
The Federal Rules did not, however, purport 
to change the basic holding of Scott v. N edy that 
the right to trial by jury of legal claims must be 
prt-servC"d. Quite the contrary, Rule 38 \a). ~x· i 
pressly reaffirms that constitutional pnnc1p e. 
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declaring: 'The right of trial by jury as declared 
by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution 
or as given by a statute of the United States 
shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.' None-
theless, after the adoption of the Federal Rules, 
attempts were made indirectlv to undercut that 
right by having federal cou;ts in which cases 
involving both legal and equitable claims were 
filed decide the equitable claim first. The result of 
this procedure in those cases in which it was fol-
lowed was that any issue common to both the 
legal and equitable claims was finally determined 
by the court and the party seeking trial by jury 
on the legal claim was deprived of that right as 
to these common issues. This procedure finally 
came before us in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. West-
over, a case which, like this one, arose from the 
denial of a petition for mandamus to compel a 
district judge to vacate his order striking a de-
mand for trial by jury. 
Our decision reversing that case not only 
emphasizes the responsibility of the Federal 
Courts of Appeals to grant mandamus where nec-
essary to protect the constitutional right to trial 
by jury but also limits the issues open for deter-
mination here by defining the protection to which 
that right is entitled in cases involving both legal 
and equitable claims. The holding in Beacon 
Theatres was that where both legal and equitable 
issues are presented in a single case, 'only under 
the most imperative circumstances, circumstances 
which in view of the flexible procedures of the 
Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the 
right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through 
prior determination of equitable claims.' That 
holding, of course, applies whether the trial judge 
chooses to characterize the legal issues presented 
as 'incidental' to equitable issues or not. Con-
sequently, in a case such as this where there cannot 
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ev~n be a contention that an>T h•gal isstws for 
wlueh a trial by jury is tirnel>T and properlv de-
manded lw submitted tu a jury." · 
':L1he Court then statl'd: 
"Petitioner's eontention, as set forth in it' 
petition for rnandamm; to the Court of A1J1wab 
and reiterated in its hrids lwfore this Court is 
that insofar as the complaint requests a mo:m 
judgment it presents a claim which is unquestio~­
ably legal. ~We agree with that contention .... 
As an action on a debt allegl•dly dtw under a 
contract, it would be difficult to conceive of an 
action of' a more traditionally legal character." 
The Court f'udlwr stated: 
"The respondents' contention that this mon~) 
claim is 'purely equitable' is based prirnaril,\- upon 
the fact that their complaint is cast in terms of an 
'accounting,' rather than in terms of an action for 
'debt' or 'damages.' But the constitutional right 
to (l trial lJy Jury cawwt be made to ,depc11d 11pv11 
the choice of 1cords used in the plcadiugs. 'i'lw 
necessary prerequisite to the right to maintain a 
snit for an equitable accounting, like all otlwr 
equitable remedies, is, as \\'e pointed out in Beacon 
Theatres, the absence of' an adequate remedy at 
law. Consequently, in order to maintain sueh .a 
suit on a cause of' action cognizable at law, as tlns 
one is, the plaintiff must be able to show that tl11' 
'aeeounts between the parties' are of' such a 'com-
plicated nature' that only a court of' equity ('an 
satisf'actorilv unravel them. In view of' the po\Hl'S 
givPn to Dis.trid Courts hy Federal Hule of Civil 
Prnc0dnre 53(b) to appoint maskrs to assist the 
jury in those exceptional eases where the lega~ 
issues are too complicated for the jury adefluatel: 
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to handle alone, the burden of such a showing is 
considerably increased and it will indeed be a rare 
case in which it can be met. But be that as it may, 
this is certainly not such a case. A jury, under 
pro1wr instructions from the court, could readily 
dd<•nnine the recovery, if any, to be had here, 
whC'ther the theory finally settled upon is that of 
lireach of contract, that of trademark infringe-
11wnt, or any combination of the two. The legal 
n•med:v cannot he characterized as inadequate 
lll<'rely because the measure of damages may nec-
(•ssitate a look into petitioner's business records." 
( Ephasis added.) 
Vinall>· \H' wish to point out to the Court that Section 
l'i-:;:3-9, Ptah Code Annotated 1953 provides that where 
a Lh•(']araton· .Tndgment action "involves the determina-
tion of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and 
d1·f1·n11i1wd in tlw same manner as iss1ws of fact are 
tri.,d and rletennined in other civil actions in the court 
in \d1i«h tlw proeeedin2,' is pending." 
B. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THAT APPELLANT HAD TO PROVE THAT THE 
CONDUCT OF THE PRINCIPALS OR RESPONDENT 
CORPORATION IN DEALING WITH THEMSELVES 
IN CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY FROM 
RESPONDENT CORPORATION WAS DISHONEST 
AND FRAUDULENT AS TO APPELLANT. 
Appellant contends that under terms of the contract 
it was the duty of Respondent corporation to effect 
an orderly development of tlw property and sell the 
l'P~i<lential lots at tlwir fair market value. Respondent, 
29 
hoY1-e\TPr, conveyed more than half of the lots in subdi-
vision 1 through -± to its sol(· stockholden;, offic<>rn and 
directors "for a fix_ed and d.Pt('nnined consid(•ratio11 of 
$3,000.00 lJer lot." r.I'he first conveyance of lots in sub-
division No. 1 took place in X ovcrnhe1· 1959 wlwn 2i 
lots \Vere conveyed for the rPcited consideration of $3,-
000.00 per lot. The next conveyance took place 18 months 
later in .May 1961 when 1 lot was conveyed from snh-
division No. 1, 21 lots in subdivision No. 2 and 51 lob 
in subdivision No. 3. The third conveyance was in Sql-
tember 1962, nearly three years after the first convey-
ance when 8 lots were conveyed in subdivision No. 4. 
Further, the first conveyance in November 1959 occurred 
within a fe-w days after the approval of the subdivision 
and the recording of the plat so that it would have hl'en 
iE1possible to have had any experience in determining 
·what these lots would have sold for on the open market. 
Nor does Respondent corporation claim that it ewr 
offered the lots to the public at tlH:' same iuice which 
it conveyed the lots to its sole officers and director~. 
The purchase price of the lots offered to the public 
from the same subdivisions ranged in pricP from $:),-
900.00 to $7,500.00. It is also significant to point out 
that when the first conveyance was made by the Re-
spondent corporation to its sole officers and director~ 
a sale was intended. In a letter written to Appellant an<l 
Mr. N orvel E. Safford (one of th(~ other persons com-
prising Second Party) dated May 26, 1961, and signed 
by both Owen \V. Bunker and C. Taylor Burton (then 
the surviving directors and stockholders of Respondent 
Corporation) the purported ci rcurnstances giving rise to 
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the necessity for the conveyance are set forth. After 
dating that it had been necessary for the sponsors to 
make cash contributions to Respondent Corporation the 
letter states that such contributions "have been secured 
to the sponsors by the corporation deeding to them suf-
ficient lots to equal the cash neecssary to keep the com-
pany's land payments current." (Exhibit 42-P) 
The minutes of the Board of Directors of Respondent 
Corporation record the transaction as follows: 
"More money will be required before spring 
lot sales can be made to carry the contract pay-
ments, so it appears the principals will have to 
make further contributions. Mr. Bunker stated 
he was unwilling to do so without at least some 
kind of security for a return of some of the funds 
already advanced. As a method of reducing the 
Company's obligation to the principals he sug-
gested each taking title to some lots to offset 
some of the Company's borrowings. The lots 
would be taken at cost, after determining same, 
for $3,000.00 which was offered by Mr. Shaw, or 
whichever was greater. Mr. Graff and Mr. Burton 
<~ach agreed to this procedure. A future financing 
for the Company is needed before sales are able 
to pick up necessary contract payments, cash ad-
vances may be handled in the same manner." 
(R. 34, 35) 
Although the minutes also reflect certain offers had 
he en made for lots in subdivision No. 1 for $3,000.00 per 
lot as of November 1959, there was no attempt at any 
time thereafter to obtain appraisals of the lots when 
substantial numbers were conveyed in May of 1961 and 
again when the transfer of eight lots was made in Sep-
tember 1962. 
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Th(' lom•r court, both during th(' trial and in it, 
l\frmorandum DPcision, intPrpreted the contract to re-
quire Appella11t to prove that the transaction 1whn·Pll 
RPspomlPnt Corporation and its sole sto<'kl10ld\'rs, offi- ' 
CPrs and directors ,,-as m1consciona!Jl(', fraudulent anrl 
unfair in order to fix a pricP on tlw lots conveypd to , 
such prineivals different from that \\·hich tlwy them-
selves fiX('d. In fact, the Findings of tlw trial eonrt 
on this matter an• as follows: 
"lS. The evidencp adduced by plaintiff did 
not show had faith, unfair dealings, unreasonahle, 
unconscionable or arbitrary conduct on the part 
of Happy Y alley \\'ith regard to the transaction~ , 
referrPd to in 11-,indings 5, (), 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and E 
nor was Happy Valley's conduct with regard 
therf'to shovrn to be fraudulent as to plaintiff. 
There has been no showing made that Happy 
Valley acted unreasonably under the circum-
stances.'' (R. 215) 
\Vitl10ut regard to whetlwr tlw Court llroperl~- in-
terp1·etecl the provisions of tlw contract to limit Appel-
lant to t lw actual "procPeds" regardless of tlw amount 
thnPof, the det<>rmination that the burden was upon 
A1ipellant to prov(' the unfairness or fraudul('nt nature . 
of the transaction wherPby tlw corporation through it~ i 
sole officers and directors conveyed 108 of its 150 sub-
dividt>d lots to such officers and directors is clearly in 
error. In considering the qrn•stion of the propriety of 
the action of a director or officPr of a corporation in , 
acquiring corporate propPrty, Fletcher 011 Corporatious 
(Permanent Edition) Rei;ised l'ol. No. 3, Sectio11 9-!9 
states: 
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"If the sale is actually, or in effect, made by 
the officer to himself, as where he wholly or 
partially represents the corporation and also is 
the purchaser either as an individual or as a mem-
ber of a firm or the like, the sale is voidable at 
the option of the corporation merely because of the 
relationship of the pa,rties and without regard to 
whether the sale is a fair or an unfair one, accord-
ing to the general rule already stated. Thus, a 
director of a corporatio cannot become the pitr-
chaser of property of the corporation which it is 
his duty to sell. Likewise, the president of a cor-
poration has no authority to sell its goods to 
himself, nor can he sell its future output to him-
self so as to cut off a prior vendor's lien of which 
he as president was bound to take notice. So the 
president of a corporation cannot purchase notes 
belonging to the corporation from the corporation 
as represented by himself and indorse them to 
himself." (Emphasis added.) 
It must be remembered here that the officers to 
whom the property ·was conveyed were the persons who 
authorized the conveyance and who had the duty as the 
officrrs of the corporation to subdivide and sell the 
property pursuant to the terms of the contract. Thus 
the law is that the sale is voidable at the option of the 
corporation merely because of the relationship without 
regard to 'Whether the sale is fair or unfair. Again, as 
~tated in Fletcher, ibid. Section 937: 
"It is self-evident tha.t if a majority of the 
directors are adversely interested, then any trans-
action between themselves and the corporation as 
represented by its board of directors is simply a 
case of officers dealing 1uith thernselves. It has 
been held that the entire board of directors cannot 
contract u:ith the corporation, since there is no 
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one to represent the corporation. This is un-
doubtedly true if it merely means that such a 
contract is voidable as distinguished from being 
void. _ Futhermore, such dealings undoubtedly arP 
to be considered as dealings between interested 
officers acting for themselves as one party to the 
contract and acting for the corporation as the 
other party to the contract, so as to authorize the 
corporation to set aside the contract merely on 
the ground of the relationship of the partie' 
without reference to its fairness or the good faith 
of the parties." (Emphasis added.) 
Fletcher also discusses the responsibility on the part 
of the offict.'r or director acquiring assets of property of 
the corporation to prove the fairness of the transaction 
(even where he is not dealing with himself because other 
directors approved the transaction): 
"In this connection, however, the question to 
be considered is what are the presumptions and 
upon whom the burden of proof rests where the 
ground urged for setting aside the transaction 
is that it is unfair or entered into in bad faith. 
As to this matter, the courts agree that while there 
is no presumption of unfairness or bad faith in 
the first instance, unless the facts of the particular 
case are such as to naturally raise such a presump-
tion yet the burden is on the .director seeking to 
uph~ld the transaction not only to prove the good 
faith of the transaction but also to show its inh~r­
ent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporat10 11 
and those interested therein." (Ibid. Sec. 921) 
A landmark case on this point is Pepper v. Litton, 
308 U.S. 295, 84 L. ed 281, 60 S. Ct. 238 decided by thl' 
Supreme Court of the United States. The Court tltet'l' 
stated the law to be: 
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"A director is a fiduciary. Twin-Lick Oil Co. 
v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 588, 23 L. ed 329 330. 
So is a dominant or controlling stockhold~r or 
group of stockholders. Southern P. Co. v. Bogert, 
250 U.S. 483, 492, 63 L. ed 1099, 1107, 39 S. Ct. 533. 
Their powers are powers in trust. See Jackson v. 
Lu de ling, 21 VY all, 616, 624, 22 L. ed 492, 495. Their 
dealings with the corporation are subjected to 
rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts 
or engagements with the corporation is challenged 
the bitrden is on the director or stockholder not 
only to prove the good faith of the transaction but 
also to show its inherent f alirness from the view-
point of the corporation and those interested 
therein. Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co. 254 
U.S. 590, 599, 65 L. ed 425, 432, 41 S. Ct. 209. The 
essence of the test is whether or not under all the 
circumstances the transaction carries the ear-
marks of an arm's length bargain. If it does not, 
equity will set it aside. While normally that fidu-
ciary obligation is enforceable directly by the 
corporation, or through a stockholder's derivative 
action, it is, in the event of bankruptcy of the 
corporation, enforceable by the trustee. For that 
standard of fiduciary obligation is designed for 
the protection of the entire community of interests 
in the corporation - creditors as well as stock-
holders.'-· (Emphasis added.) 
It is to be noted that the Court specifically states 
that the standard of fiduciary obligation is designed "for 
the protection of the entire community of interests in the 
corporation - creditors as well as stockholders." This, 
of course, includes Appellant in the present situation 
because he is a creditor of the corporation in connection 
with any sale by the corporation of its lots, to the extent 
of his interest in the proceeds of said sale. 
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The principles enunciated above with respect to di. 
rectors of a corporation <l(•aliHg with tlwmsdves as indi. 
viduals were early recognized by onr Suprernp Court. 
In the case of Bear Ri-i:er l'allcy Orchard Co. v. llruiley, 
15 Utah 50G, ()() Pac. Gll, tlll' Court liPld: 
"Agents cannot bind their principals by con. 
tracts with respect to subject:-; in which they may 
have opposing interests. In such a case tlwir ow;1 
interests may interfere with their duty to their 
principal. Self - interest may turn out to be a 
stronger motive than their obligation to tlwir 
principals. Under :-;uch circunrntances the law 1rill 
not allow them to serve two masters, - to he led 
into such temptation. Victor Gold & Silver Min. 
Co. v. National Bank of the Republic (Utah) +9 
Pac. 82G; \Vardell v. Railroad Co., 103 F.S. G51: 
l\f echem, Ag. Secs. 455, 45G; 1 .Mor. Priv. Coq1. 
Sec. 517; McGourkPy v. Railway, 14G U.S. 536, 
13 Sup. Ct. 170." 
In the later ease of Glen Allen J!i11i11g Co. r. Pork 
Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 3G2, 296 Pac. 231, our Su-
preme Court reversed the trial eourt in res1wet to tlll' 
transfer of certain corporate assets, holding: 
"The authorities evr.rywhere recognize the 
rule that, irhere n fiduciary relation is shown 111 
exist, the u11rden is 11pon the fiduciary to sho11 
good faith a11d fair dealing iu his relations 1rdh 
his cestui qite trust. It is frequently said that the 
relation of a director to his corporation is not that 
of trustee and cestui que trust. But it does not 
follow from that statement that the director is ~ot 
bound by tlw same rules of good faith, full dis· 
closurP, and fair dPaling as surrounds the trustee 
in dealing ·with the cestui que trust. As age~ts 
in trusted -with the management of the corporation 
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for the benefit of the stockholders and creditors 
' they occupy a :fiduciary relation, and are held liable 
to the corporation as trustees. The liability of 
directors and other officers to the corporation is 
determined by substantially the same principles 
which determine the liability of any other agent 
to his principal for failure to perform the duties 
which he has undertaken. 
"Pomeroy in his work on Equity Jurisprud-
ence, Sec. 1077, states the rules as follows: 
"'As long as the confidential relation lasts 
the trustee or other fiduciary owes an undivided 
duty to his beneficiary, and cannot place himself 
in any other position which would subject him 
to conflicting duties or expose him cestui que 
trust. The rule applies alike to agents, partners, 
guardians, executors, and administrators direct-
ing and managing officers of corporations as well 
as to technical trustees. The most important phase 
of this rule is that which forbids trustees and 
other fiduciaries from dealing in their own behalf 
with respect to matters involved in the trust, and 
this prohibition operates irrespectively of the 
good faith or bad faith of such dealing.' " (Em-
phasis added) 
:\Ion' recently in the case of Hansen v. Granite I-Iold-
i11q Company, 117 Ftah 530, 210 P. 2d 274, the Court 
set aside a purported sale and conveyance of real prop-
erty by a corporation to a son of the prineipal stockholder 
and president and general manager of the corporation. 
Defendant had paid a total of $84,500.00 for the property 
which wa:-; appraised during the course of trial from 
$90,000.00 by Defendant's appraisers to $115,000.00 by 
Plaintiff's appraisers. The Trial Court found the prop-
el't~, to he rPasonably worth the sum of $100,000.00. On 
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appeal, the Supreme Court announced the rule with re. 
spect to corporate management dealing with the corpora. 
tion as follows : 
"But a fiduciary relation exists between the 
board of directors and the management of the 
corporation on one hand, and the stockholders on 
the other and where the management is interested 
in any deal with the corporation so that its inter-
ests are contrary to that of the corporation, then 
its actions must be open and above board and their 
dealings must be carried on with the utmost fair-
ness and good faith. In such cases courts of equity 
will carefully scrutinize the dealings of the man-
agement and set aside such transactions on slight 
grounds. Noble Mercantile Co. v. Mt. Pleasant 
Co-operative Inst., 12 Utah 213, 42 P. 869; Victor 
Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. National Bank, 1~ 
Utah 391, 49 P. 826; Mcintyre v. Ajax Mining Co., 
17 Utah 213, 53 P. 1124; Erwin v. Oregon R. & 
Nav. Co., C. C., 27 F. 625." 
See, also, Clark and Wilson Lumber Co. of Delawarr 
v. McAllister, (9 Cir.) 101 F. 2d 709; Mardel Securities, 
1 
Inc. v. Ale:x:andria Gazette Corp., (-! Cir.) 320 F. 2d 890. , 
In the light of the foregoing it is hard to understand i 
how the Trial Court could have concluded that Appellant • 
had to prove that the conduct of the sole stockholderi. : 
officers, and directors of Respondent Corporation (in : 
conveying Respondent's real property to themselves) : 
was unfair, unreasonable or unconscionable. In fact, i 
however, Respondent's own evidence clearly demon : 
strates that except for the initial conveyance in November ; 
of 1959, the lots conveyed by the principals to themselvef 
were worth considerably in excess of the amount which 
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\\'as determined to be the purchase price. :Mr. C. Francis 
Solomon called as a witness for the Respondent Cor-
poration testified that he was a professional fee ap-
praiHer; that he had made appraisals of the lots in 
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, and 4 as of the dates on which 
the transfers had been made from Respondent Corpora-
tion to its principals. His appraisal was made on the 
basis .of individual lots and is summarized in Exhibit 
59-D. (R. 1199-1202) The Exhibit in question which con-
tains his appraisal reveals that of the 28 lots appraised in 
subdivision No. 1, only 18 were appraised at $3,000.00 
or less and the average appraisal for the lots in such 
subdivision as of November 1959 was $3,080.00 per lot. 
With respect to the 20 lots conveyed by the Respondent 
to its officers and directors from subdivision No. 2 in 
May 1961, none were appraised at $3,000.00 or less and 
the average appraisal was $3,660.00 per lot. In respect 
to the 52 lots conveyed in l\:Iay of 1961 from subdivision 
~o. 3, only 3 lots were appraised at $3,000.00 or less and 
the average appraisal was $3,500.00 per lot. Of the 8 lots 
appraised in subdivision No. 4 as of September 1962, 
none were appraised at $3,000.00 or less and the average 
appraisal for said lots was $3,500.00. The total difference 
lwtween the "price" used by Respondent's principals in 
conveying the lots to themselves and the fair market 
vaJue of these lots at the time of such conveyance as 
appraised by Respondent's own witness is $45,050.00. 
Since Mr. Solomon's appraisal was the only independent 
appraisal submitted by Respondent Corporation during 
the trial of the case as to the lots in subdivisions 2, 3, and 
~' the trial Court would have concluded under any cir-
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cumstances that the transaction \n:ls fair and equitahlP 
to all persons interested therein. 
This does not consider the appraisals of Don W. 
• 
Stahle and Edward .M. Ashton, both of whom submittt·d 
appraisals to Respondent as to the lots in subdivision 
No. 1 as of N overnber 1959. J\f r. Stahle appraised tlw 
lots of the average fair market value of $3,500.00 ver 
lot (Exh. 9-D); and l\Ir. Ashton appraised the same 
lots to be of the average fair market value of $3,4:50.00 
per lot. Using these figures as a basis for value of the 
lots in subdivision No. 1 instead of Mr. Solmon's figure~ , 
for such subdivision would increase the difference be-
tween what the principals took the lots for and what the 1 
fair market value \Yas from $±5,050 to $57,810.00. Nor 
does this take into consideration the fair market valnP 
of the lots testified to by the several witne>sses who \rerP 
called by Appellant. These figures are substantiall)· 
higher than the figures of 1\Tr. Solomon. (Exh. 38-P) 
c. 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER AND 
MAKE FINDINGS IN RESPECT TO THE RIGHTS 
OF APPELLANT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE 
CONTRACT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
PROPERTY, THE SUBJECT OF THE AGREEMENT. 
Although the Pretrial Order specifically states that 
the action is one "for declaratory relief as to the rights 
of the Plaintiff" and sets forth that one of the claims 
of the Plaintiff is that he is entitled to a declaratory 
judgment determining his rights under the August 8, 
1957 contract as to accountings, times of pa:rnwnt and 
40 
the rate and manner of development of the properties, 
the subject of the Agreement,'' the Court refused to con-
~i<ler an)' testimony regarding the terms of the contract 
\rith respect to the development of the properties and 
made no findings in reference to the rights of the Appel-
lant in respect thereto. (R. 196) 
'l'lw Agr<,ement of August 8, 1957 between the parties 
recites that First Party (Respondent) is the owner or 
Pntitled to sell certain land situated in Salt Lake County 
denominated the "entire premises" and desires to 
clfn,'elop those premises to subdivide a portion thereof 
for n·sidPntial building lots and reserve a suitable por-
tion for use as a golf course. The Agreement further 
rPcite::.; that it is the intention and desire of Second Party 
(ineluding Appellant herein) to effect the organization of 
the Willow Creek Country Club for the purpose of buying 
and dewloping a portion of the entire premises as a 
golf course. (R. 137) The contract then provides that 
First Party agrees to sell and Second Party agrees to 
aequire the portion of the entire premises for a golf 
eonnw and First Party further agrees to furnish culin-
ar)' and irrigation ·water to satisfy the needs of the 
Country Club. 
First Party then agrees to use its best efforts to 
e::rnse the balance of the entire premises to be zoned for 
C'la::.;s "A" residential purposes and agrees to develop, 
:-nbdivide, and sell as residential lots and a shopping 
CPnter in conjunction therewith all of the entire premises 
PXCt>pt those sold for Club purposc->s. Paragraph 6 of the 
Contract specifically states that "said entire prc->mises 
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shall not he sold or developed in any other manner excejl! 
upon the written consent of Second Party." 
The Court made no finding as to the responsibilit)·, 
if any, of First Party to make an orderly development 
of the property or to subdivide and sell the property as 
residential lots as contended for by Appellant nor did 
it make any finding in reference to this matter. Thi., 
Court has repeatedly held, both before and since tlw 
adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that 
findings must respond to and cover all the material 
issues raised by the pleadings \\·hether evidence respect-
ing them was or was not adduced and if there be no such 
express or simplied findings the judgment has no support. 
See Simper v. Brown, 7-± u tah 178, 278 P. 529. In tht· 
recent case of Gaddis Investment Co. v. Morrison, 3 r. 
2d 43, 278 P. 284, The Court held: 
"The defendant's answer raised the issue of 
abandonment of the contract but the trial court 
made no finding regarding it. Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 52 provides: 
'In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury * * * the court shall, unless the same was 
waived, find the facts specially and stat~ separ· 
ately its conclusions of law thereon and duect the 
entry of the appropriate judgment; * * • .' 
''It appears that. the judgment was based 
principally upon the findings that the contract 
v\·as entered into and the commission had not been 
paid, totally disregarding· defendant's answer to 
the complaint. It has been frequently held that th~ 
failure of the trial court to make findings 01 
fact on all material issues is reversible error 
where it is prejudicial. Hall v. Sabey, 58 Uta 1 
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343, 198 P. 1110; Baker v. Hatch, 70 Utah 1, 257 
P. 637; Prows v. Howley, 72 Utah 444, 271 P. 31; 
Simper v. Brown, 74 Utah a78, 278 P. 529; West 
v. Standard Fuel Co., 81 Utah 300, 17 P. 2d 292; 
Pike v. Clark, 95 Utah 235, 79 P. 2d 1010." 
We submit that by the lower court concluding that 
tlw action ~was for an equitable accounting only it failed 
to consider and pass upon all the issues raised by the 
Pretrial Order and therefore that the judgment should 
he rewrsed for this matter to be considered and resolved. 
D. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO HEAR AND 
RECEIVE CERTAIN TESTIMONY. 
By the Court limiting the trial to a hearing of an 
equitable accounting at the outset of the trial, Appellant 
\ras very limited in the nature of the testimony which 
he could adduce. Even so, there were times during the 
trial when evidence was excluded that would have related 
directly to the good faith of the principals of Respondent 
Corporation in dealing with themselves. During the 
l'ourse of examination of Mr. Owen W. Bunker, Appellant 
off erpd to prove by the witness that several lots received 
hy him from the Respondent were resold at substantially 
higher prices; that in September 1961 Lot 561 in subdivi-
~ion No. l was sold to Leon J. Nicolaides for the price 
of $7,500.00; that on October 9, 1961 Lot 37 in subdivision 
;\ o. 2 was sold to Richard Prows, Inc. for $7 ,500.00 in 
cash; that Lot 33 in subdivision No. 2 was sold to the 
Johnsons on October 4, 1963 for $6,500.00 and Lot 32 
in subdivision No. 2 was sold to the Rowleys on May 21, 
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1963 for $7,200.00; that Lot 21 in subdivisi1 
sold to the Mc Kays on ,July 12, ] ~)()2 for ~ 
Lot 26 ·was sold to Award Honws on Octobe 
$6,000.00 cash. (R. 582, 583) Avrwllant fu 
to show hy the tt>stimony of Mr. C. Taylor 
on April 15, 1%2 he sold Lot 9 in suhdivi: 
the Gordons for $G,OOO.OO; that on 1\tay 2, 
Lot 8 in subdivision No. 3 to Ferre for $ 
Lot 27 in the same subdivision to the 1\1a1 
000.00; that he sold Lot 28 in the subdivii 
Gordon and Bush on July 1, 1963 for $7,0( 
54 in the same subdivision to Donald Dysoi 
8, 1963 for $6,000.00 and Lot 55 to a LeRoy : 
same terms as the sale for Donald Dyso1 
would testify that he sold Lot 10 in subd 
to Gordon and Bush in April 1963 for $ 
additional terms being involved. (R. 585, ~ 
In denying the proffer of proof the C( 
"The court takes note of the pr 
objections made, and it appears to 1 
this is a proffer of the - of some of 
of a sale, and without proof of any e; 
of any competent witness with r4 
comparability of the proffered sal 
sales with respect to which plaintif 
the accounting now made is unconsc 
reasonable in the light of the obj 
summarizing those and the views 
I think the law is that proof of a 
alone is no proof of comparable sal 
proof of the fair market value of t 
which plaintiff claims the accountin. 
defendant js unconscionable or 
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Accordingly, the off er - the pro ff er of proof -
is refused." (R. 591) 
Appellant submits, howev~r, that the foregoing evi-
clenee was material and relevant and should have been 
received where the principals took conveyance of lots 
from the Coropration for the sum of $3,000.00 per lot 
and in turn sold them for $6,000.00 to $7 ,500.00 per lot. 
Therefore, this testimony was admissible and should have 
been considered by the Court in determining whether or 
not the conduct and actions of the directors was in fact 
conscionable and fair as far as the Appellant is concerned. 
In the course of examination of C. Taylor Burton by 
Hespon<l(~nt Corporation, the witness identified certain 
appraisals which had been obtained by the stockholders, 
officers and directors of Respondent Corporation. (Exhs. 
S-D to 13-D) Most of these appraisals we1·e dated approx-
imately a year after the conveyance but ref erred to the 
date of sale as the value date. Upon being examined on 
Yoir dire by Appellant, 1lr. Burton testified that these 
appraisals were used in the negotiations with the Federal 
(Jovt>rmnent on tax questions which concerned the value 
of the pro1wrty taken by the stockholders and directors 
from th(' Corporation. (R. 371) Subsequently, in the 
course of cross examination of :Mr. Burton, Appellant 
attempted to inquire further into the matter by asking 
him concerning the difficulty with the Federal Govern-
ment which necessitated their revaluing for tax purposes 
tlw 24 lots received by them from the Corporation in 
suhdivision No. 1. 
An objection by Respondent was sustained by the 
Court thereby precluding Appellant from ascertaining 
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what value the parties had accepted with the Federal 
Government, in connnection ·with which the very exhibits 
which had been received' in evidence was used. Thi8 
again was material and relevant in determining the fair. 
ness of the transaction behveen the principals and the 
Corporation. 
We respectfully submit that the errors committed by 
the trial court in the analysis and determination of the 
issues in the case and in the limitation of the evidence 
received in the matter requires this Court to reverse the 
judgment and send it back for a new trial before a jury. 
IL 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ANALYSIS AND IN-
TERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT OF AUGUST 
8. 1957. 
Not only did the trial court misconstrue the isslm 
in the case and fail to consider all of them, it likewi8e 
failed properly to interpret the contract between the 
parties and failed to give effect to all of its terms. It 
is a well recognized principle of law that it is not only 
for a breach of express promises in a contract that a 
person is liable, but also for a breach of implied promise~ 
as well. As stated by Williston on Contracts, Rei·iscd 
Edition, Fol. 5, Sec. 1293: 
"Since the governing principle in the ~onna: 
tion of contracts is the justifiable assumption b~ 
one party of a certain intention on th.e pa~ 0a 
another the undertaking of each pronnssor m 
' h" l a contract must include any promises w i~ 1 
reasonable person in the position.of the promis~e~ 
would be justified in understanding or rnclude · 
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In the case of Watson Brothers Transportation Co., 
Inc. v. Jaffa (B Cir.) 143 F. 2d 340, the Court made the 
following statement: 
"Aside from the allegation of the petition that 
Jaffa did make such an agreement, it is to be noted 
that although the written agreement contains no 
express provision that Jaffa will cooperate with 
vV atson Bros., Inc., to meet the formal require-
ments for approval of an application for permis-
sion to operate trucking routes under a lease, 
it is well settled that a contract includes not only 
the terms set forth in express words, but in addi-
tion all implied provisions indispensable to eff ectu-
ate the intention of the parties and carry out the 
contract, and in the absence of which the contract 
could not be effectively performed. Sacramento 
N av. Co. v. Salz, 273 U.S. 326, 329, 47 S. Ct. 368, 
71 L. ed 663; New York Casualty Co. v. Sinclair 
Refining Co., 10 Cir., 108 F. 2d 65, 69; Montrose 
Contracting Co. v. Westchester County, 2 Cir., 94 
F. 2d 580, 582; American Central Insurance Co. 
v. McHose, 3 Cir., 66 F. 2d 749, 751; Baldwin 
Rubber Co. v. Paine & Williams Co., 6 Cir., 1107 
F. 2d 350, 353; Williston on Contracts, Sec. 1293 
et seq.; see Cornell Law Quarterly 615; 23 Minn. 
Law Rev. 189. In determining whether the prin-
ciple is applicable, the nature of the contract, the 
circumstances under which it was made, the situa-
tion of the parties and the objects they had in view 
in making the contract should be considered." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In the instant case Appellant contends that where 
RPS}Jondent transferred lots to its sole stockholders, of-
firers and directors, the Court should have required it 
to account on the basis of the fair market value at the 
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time of such conveyance or in the alternative treated thP 
matter as not being a salP until the~ principals in turn 
sold such lots at which time the amonnt received by the111 
would be treated as the gross proceE~ds. Certainly therP 
vrns an ''implied" agreement that the Respondent Cor-
poration would not sell the lots to its sole stockholder~, 
officers and directors for a price less than the fair mar-
ket value thereof. 
In the case of Reback v. Story Proditction, 111c. !I 
A.D. 880, 193 N.Y.S. 2d 520, the New York Court held 
that an agreement whereby a buyer of exclusive motion 
picture and television rights undertook to pay tlw seller 
a guaranteed minimum and iwrcentage of proce('ds in 
excess thereof also imposed the duty on the buyer to 
<>xploit the rights in l't~spect to which the ro~"alty 'ra' 
to be paid and at least to use its best efforts to sPll 
and dispose of the film contracts so as to create a i1ro-
ceeds from which to pay the percentage. Again, i11 till' 
case of Daitch Crystal Dairies, Inc. v. N eisloss, 8 N.I. 
2d 723, 201 N.Y.S. 2d 101, the Court of Appeals of Ne11 
York held that where a lessor rented a store to a lessPr 
with a "percentage' lease clause and covenanted not tu 
rent other space in the same building for similar usr 
and a plot plan attached to the lease showed an adjoining 
vacant lot, not uwned by the lessor, the lessor could not 
thereafter acquire such adjoining property and lease the 
same for a similar use. 
A good discussion on the question of ·what is meant 
by "proceeds" in connection with an oil and gas lease 
is found in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, (5 Cir.) 
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1 ;)5 F. 2d 185. There the Court was concerned with the 
intPrpretation of a clause in a lease providing for the 
payment to the lessor of 1/8 of the "net proceeds'' de-
rived from the sale of gas at the mouth of the well. There 
11as a further provision in the contract relating to oil 
1\·hich used the expression "current market price." The 
Court held that where the lessee used some of the gas 
to manufacture a different compound, lessor would be 
Pntitled to receive his proportionate cost of the fair 
market value of the gas. w· e quote from the Court's 
<li:-:cussion: 
"The law often resorts to 'fair value' or 'fair 
market value,' when 'market price' is stipulated 
and there is no market, or when 'proceeds' are 
stipulated and there is no sale. This is because 
the contract evidently intends payment shall be 
made, and value is the nearest approach possible 
under the circumstances to the measure of pay-
ment contracted for." 
Tt is interesting to note that in the Phillips Case the 
Conrt detPnnined that the accounting between the parties 
to an oil and gas lease was properly tried as an action 
at law hefore a jury. 
Certainly the Court should have construed the term 
"gross proceeds" to mean not less than fair market value 
if Hespondent was going to convey the lots to its sole 
Ktockholders, officers and directors. 
As heretofore stated, Paragraph 6 of the Agreement 
h0tween the parties provides that "it is the intention of 
Fir::;t Party to develop, subdivide, and sell as residential 
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lots, and as shopping center in conjunction therewith all 
' of said entire premiS('S, l'XCt>pt the Club lH'emisPs," anri 
further that "said entire premises shall not be sold 01 
conveyed in any other manner except upon the writtPJi 
consent of Second Party." ( R. 51) (Emphasis added.) 
N ohvithstanding this provision Respondent Corporation 
madl~ conveyances of propert~, other than as residPntinJ 
lots. On or about .J anua1·y 29, 1962 Respondent conveyed 
a tract of approximatelv 30 acrPs (31.07 acres hY actual . . 
snrvey) to Twenty-Five Associates, Inc. and R. E. Mc 
Conaughy in exchange for their interest (as part 01 
Second Party) in the very contract in ql'.tistion. (R. 31. 
32) The TwentyFive Associates, Inc. and Mr. Conaughy 
owned a total of 50.9% of the interest in Second Part: 
according to the contract. ( R. 53) Appellant contendPd 
that this conveyance ·was in violation of the provision~ 
of the contract and that he was entitled to recover hii 
proportionate share of the fair market value of thi> 
acreage as it would have been divided into residential loL 
and sold as such as of th<> date of the conveyance. When 
Appellant attempted to have George B. Gudgell, a li-
censed land surveyor and consulting engineer, testify a! 
to lmw the tract in question could have been diveded intP 
residential lots, an objection by the Respondent wai 
sustained. (R. 288) Thereaftt>r wlwn Appellant attempted : 
to adduce testimony as to the value of this propert)· I 
as individual lots, the Court sustaim•d objection thereto, I 
stating that he was construing the contract to require , 
Respondt>nt Corporation "to sell for residential lot~" 1 
and that Respondent Corporation \\'as not required to 
sell the property lot h)' lot as residC>ntial lots. (R. +951 • 
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1'his same view was expressed in the Court's Supple-
mental Decision wherein stated that since the tract was 
wnPd for residential use it was sold for residential lots 
l'\'en though sold as an entire tract. (R. 210) 
\Ve submit that the language of the contract is un-
l'((Uivocal and requires the property to be subdivided and 
f'old a~ lots in order to assure that the highest price be 
obtained for such property. In any event, if there was 
any ambiguity in the contract such ambiguity should have 
br'('Jl the subject of parole evidence for the purpose of 
l'xplaining the provision and assisting the Court in de-
tPrrnining what interpretation should have been placed 
upon the contract. The Court apparently took the posi-
tion that since the third sentence of Paragraph 6 of the 
contract provides that the gross proceeds of sales of all 
such property ''sold for residential lots'' shall be divided, 
etc., and if the property were zoned for residential pur-
poses and sold for the ultimate use as residential lots this 
satisfied the provision of the contract. However, it is 
Appellant's position that the use of the word "for" in 
the third sentence and the use of the word "as" in the 
first and second sentence connotes the same meaning and 
that the property is to be sold as residential lots and the 
proceeds of such sale divided between the parties. 
Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd Edi-
tion, defines the word "as" to be "in the idea, character, 
or capacity of." This definition was accepted by the 
lllinois Supreme Court in the case of Tallman v. Eastern 
Illinois and Peoria Railroad Co., 3'79 Ill. 441, 41 N.E. 2d 
;i37 involvinO' the O'ivinO' of a deed "as and for" a right 
0 0 0 
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of way. Likewise Webster defines the word "for" tri 
mean "as being"; also "equivalent to which, anything 
is regarded or treated." In the case of Atkins v. Atki1,,. 
70 Vt. 5G3, 41 Atl. 503, a ]iolicy of insurance payable 111 
Alfr0d Atkins, Trustee, ''and the children of Jiyrm11 
Atkins" was constnwd to mean that the policy was pay 
able to Alfred Atkins as Trustee for the children. ThP 
word "and" here m0aning "for." Thus the Court con-
strued "for" as meaning "as" in substitution for th1 
word "and." 
Not only did the Court sanction the sale of tracts of 
land other than "as" residential lots, it failed to award 
to Appellant his proportionate share of the proceedi. 
In the case of the transfer of the 31.07 acres to Twent) 
Five Associates, Inc. and McConaughy, tlw Court did not 
give to Appellant either his proportionatt> share of th1• 
actual proceeds received for such transf (:'r nor his percent 
of its fair market value. The transfer of the acreage t11 
Twenty-Five Associates, Inc. and ~IcConaughy was madP 
in exchange for their 50.9% interest in the contract. 
Rather than give Appellant his percent of this considrr-
ation the Court converted the valm• of the 50.9% intcrefl 
in the contract into a mondary figure and awarded to 
Appellant the proportionate amount of such monetary 
figure. 
Appellant claims that lw should be entitled to hii 
proportionate amount of the fair market 1:aluc of tlw 
property, at the tinw of the convP~'ance, as residcnti~l 
lots. The trial court accepted Respondent Corporation.i 
determination of the value of interest received by it 
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from l\foConaughy and Twenty-Five Associates, Inc. This 
rnlue, as testified to by :Mr. Burton, was arrived at by 
taking the amount paid to N. E. Safford and American 
ln:o;urance Agency for their interest in the contract and 
n·lating such figure to the percent of interest obtained 
from Twenty-Five Associates, Inc. and McConaughy. He 
kstifif~d that the American Insurance Agency interest of 
S.~j~ was acquired for $7,000.00 and that the Safford 
interest of 5% plus the Bradshaw interest of 4.1 % (mak-
ing a total of 9.1 % ) was acquired for the sum of $7,588.80. 
On this arbitrary basis it was determined that the interest 
of the T\\'enty-Five Associates, Inc. and McConaughy 
(50.9%) \\·as worth the sum of $42,922.95. (R. 1152) 
There was no attempt at any time by Respondent 
Corporation to determine the fair market value of the 
:n.07 acres conveyed to Twenty-Five Associates and 
~frConaughy, either as an entire tract or as individual 
lots. On the other hand appraisers for Appellant testi-
fied that the fair market value of the property as an 
Pntire tract and not as individual lots was from $124,000-
.00 ( tPstified to by \Verner Kiepe - R. 904) to $133,-
750.00 (testified to by Melvin Teerlink - R. 795). 
The finding of the Court in respect to this particular 
trnrt was to the effect that the "stated agreed and 
acwpted gross proceeds received by Happy Valley for 
this conveyance was the respective interests of the 
grnntc>es as irnrt of Second Party in said agreement, 
liC'ing a total of 50.9% thereof and being of the reasonable 
cash value of $42,908.00." (R. 213) It is thus evident 
lhat the Court did not even attempt to determine the 
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fair markt>t value of tht> property conveyed but only tr 
assess tlw reasonable cash vahw of the proceeds h•. 
Happy Valley. Appellant contends that he was entitlPu 
to receivt> his proportionatr share of the fair market 
value of tlw property as individual lots or in any !'Y\'nt 
his percent of the actual proceeds received. See, Phillipi 
Petroleum Co. v. J olmson, supra. 
Again, the rrcord shows that Respondent Corpora 
tion conveyed to Estates, Inc. approximately 21/~ acres ot 
real propt>rty on May 22, 19G2. This was likewise a con 
veyance in bulk ratht>r than as st>parate individual lot.'. 
Here again the consideration received for the convevaner· 
of said property ·was something other than cash. Happ~ 
Valley reecived the benefit of certain offsite improw-
ments, \vhich the Court dl'tennined was of the ya]ui· 
of $13}-±2.85 (Finding N" o. 9, R. 213) \YP submit that 
Appellant was and is entitled to receive his proportionafr 
share of the fair market value of this property apprai~r·rl 
as individual lots and not as a whole tract. Like1risr" 
Appellant should be t>ntitled to recPive consideration for 
the transfer by Respondent Corporation to Salt Lakt 
·water Conservancy District of a tract of land approxi 
mately 100 feet wide by 130 fed (approximately the siz1• 
of a lot) which property was transferred as a well-:;;itt 
and location for a pump house. The Court refused to 
receive evidence of the value of this tract of land and 
also as to the amount of revenue stamps placed upon 
the deed of transfrr. (R 1165, Exh. 58-P) Appellant 
a()"ain submits that he should be entitk,d to receive hii 
b . 
proportionate share of the fair market value of thii 
tract. 
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SUl\IMARY 
Tn n~YiFwing the evidence and presenting his position 
Appellant has refrained from relying on the testimony of 
,\.ppellant's expert witnesses as to the value of the prop-
l'rty. Tl1is should not be construed as abandoning such 
t•Yidenc<'. However, it was felt that even without refer-
1·nce to such testimony the error of the trial court was 
plainly man if estccl. 
To have attempted to delineate all of the testimony 
in this case would have further demonstrated the extreme 
diffieult circumstances under which Appellant had to 
prl'sent his evidence. In fact we believe that the remarks 
of this Court in the case of Board of Education of Salt 
Lulcc City v. Bothwell and Swaner Company (decided 
:\.pril 2, 1963) 400 P. 2d 568 are equally applicable here. 
The Court there remarked: 
"The trial court may have had a labor pain 
or two induced by an unnecessary protraction of 
a very simple case that took over 600 pages of 
transcript to establish its simplicity. We are sure 
that the trial court really did not mean it when 
it said that 'having take'n only 1962 prices, and 
without having considered anything in 1960, the 
court is of the view that Nielsen considers the 1962 
prices more favorable to the landowner here who 
called him to testify.' The implication of dis-
honesty on the part of the witness is distasteful 
Pnon(J'h under the evidence here; but it is more 
b ' 
unforgivable for the trial court, in the middle of 
direct examination, punctuated by an erroneously 
permitted, but premature cross-examination, u~­
der the aura of the glittering magic words "voir 
dire" to evaluate the credibility of the witness, whi~h, at that juncture, was none of its business, 
hut that of the jury." 
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.Mr. \Verner Kie1w, an Pminently qualifiPd real rstate 
appraiser, had hardly begun to ksti [~; with respect to 
comparablP sales mwd by him in th<' com·sp of his a~ 
praisal when in tlw cours<' of being interrupted on a 
so-called void dire examination, tlw Court said: "lf the 
witness doesn't use more care about what lw considen 
comparables than statement just made hy cournwl wou!Q 
indicate, then I may not heli(1 Ve an.\· of his tPstimony.'' 
\Vith this sort of a prejudgment of the testimom 
of the witness, it is no wonder that the Court concludeu 
in its Memorandum Opinion that it did not beliew the 
testimony of this witness. 
Appellant respectfully ::mbmits that thP trial court 
erred in its analysis of the issues in this easP and in 
refusing to grant Appellant a jury trial, that the Court 
improperly eonstnwcl and dPfined the ternls of the con· 
tract and failPd to award to Appellant any sum of money 
for certain sales and conveyances made by Respondeni 
to third parties; that in any event the trial court failea 
to make a dPtermination of tht' rights of APlwllant under 
the contract and failed to n'quire Hespondent to show 
the good faith of tlw trarnmetions in whieh it made con· 
veyanees to its sole stockholdPrs, officers, and directors. 
\Ye resp<>ctfull,\· submit that tlw judgnwnt of the trial 
eourt should be n'Vl'rsecl and a new trial granted. 
Respectfull,\· subrnittPd, 
ARTHUR IL NIELSEN , 
FRANKLYN B. l\f ATHESO~ 
Nielst>n, Conder & Hansen 
510 N P\\·house Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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